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1. Introduction 
 
During the last century, the UK has transitioned from global trade power to 
‘awkward partner’ in the EU; then most recently an outright rejection of EU 
membership. Following these events, a new wave of academic literature exploring 
the potential impact of Brexit has started to emerge (Ottaviano et al., 2014; Dhingra et 
al., 2016; 2017, Ebell et al., 2016).1 These nationalist tendencies are in contrast to the 
moves towards forming mega-regionals, where the EU negotiating team have been 
provided with a mandate to negotiate the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) with the US.2 Therefore, research exploring the effects of TTIP has 
also started to emerge (Francois et al., 2013; Egger et al., 2015; Felbermayr et al., 2015; 
Disdier et al. , 2016).3 For the UK, its withdrawal from the EU is expected to exclude 
it from any TTIP deal. In addition, there have been mixed messages about the 
likelihood of restarting the TTIP negotiations and if the EU would be in front of the 
UK (US-UK FTA) in the queue. 
Our contribution is to cut across these separate strands of literature and in doing 
so we assess the UK position in terms of TTIP and Brexit scenarios. We also go 
further than the existing Brexit literature by modelling future Commonwealth trade 
                                                     
1 Dhingra et al. (2017) estimate welfare losses of 1.3 percent in a static model with ‘soft Brexit’ compared 
to 9.4 percent in a dynamic model with ‘hard’ Brexit. On the other hand, Ebel et al. estimate that real 
income will fall by 2.7 percent in the long run. For broad and comprehensive summary of Brexit 
literature, including future UK trade policy options and Brexit consequences for the UK and EU, please 
see Sampson (2017). 
2 The term mega-regionals refers to the TTIP, TPP and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP). 
3 Felbermayr et al. predict gains of 3.9% for the EU, where Francoise et al. estimate a more moderate 
0.48%. Furthermore, Felbermayr et al. expect third countries, outside the TTIP, to lose 0.9% due to trade 
diversion. Egger et al. suggest that the negative impact on third countries is likely to be exacerbated by a 
more discriminatory TTIP agreement. Disdier et al. investigate the interplay of the TTIP and Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) in terms of agriculture. 
 3 
relationships as well as a possible US-UK FTA after Brexit. The main channel of 
welfare effects that we consider comes from the general equilibrium effect of changes 
in trade costs.  Our analysis adopts an emerging research framework, which allows 
us to predict the impact of policy changes at the extensive and intensive margins, 
where this two-step methodology has not been applied within the Brexit literature. 
Given the uncertain outcomes and lack of detail regarding potential policy changes 
concerning TTIP and Brexit, it is problematic to pin down the changes in tariffs and 
non-tariff measures. We deal with this issue by considering ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Brexit 
scenarios, which are evaluated based on actual data for trade effects of regional trade 
agreements (RTA) in general, and customs unions (CU) and free trade agreements 
(FTA) in particular, in 162 countries over the period 1960-2014. We also look at the 
dynamics of RTA effects on trade, conditional on its duration and decade, then 
incorporate it in our welfare analysis. Our underlying assumption is that effects of 
future trade agreements can be inferred from the effects of existing trade agreements. 
If, as some would argue, the TTIP goes further than the previous RTAs in terms of 
lowering trade costs and reducing waste of resources due to harmonization of 
actionable NTMs (see Berden et al., 2009), our baseline estimates would indicate a 
conservative lower bound.  
This paper will highlight the losses stemming from the lower bargaining power 
of the UK as a stand alone country, rather than as a member of a powerful trading 
bloc.4 We will also highlight that signing FTAs with more remote countries, such as 
                                                     
4 “The US government has proposed slapping punitive tariffs on Bombardier, a Canadian aircraft maker 
with operations in Northern Ireland. … The Bombardier case gives the lie to the notion that, outside the 
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the US or Commonwealth countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, 
Pakistan, South Africa) cannot compensate for these losses, as some commentators 
suggest. In case of a ‘hard’ Brexit, the TTIP would generate additional welfare losses 
for the UK equal to 0.5-2 percent of GDP. On the other hand, our results for the soft 
Brexit scenario indicate that the UK would experience welfare losses of 
approximately 3.1 percent if the TTIP comes into force alongside the UK withdrawal 
from the EU. The negative effect of Brexit alone is 2.7 percent. Signing an FTA with 
the US or large Commonwealth countries would lower welfare losses by 
approximately 0.65 to 1.1 percent, depending on the scenario. A ‘hard’ Brexit would 
generate losses from 4.1 to 5.3 percent. These results are robust to various levels of 
TTIP impact on trade (as long as they are positive), external effects of higher 
economic growth caused by TTIP, and alternative definitions of Brexit.  
We also run a number of robustness checks. First, we present evidence of 
heterogeneous effects of different types of RTAs on trade, which is related to extent 
that NTMs go beyond tariffs. Second, we consider how additional waste of resources 
due to NTMs and border controls influences welfare (see Baldwin et al., 1997).5 
Finally, we perform a sensitivity analysis by changing our assumptions about the 
trade creating effect of TTIP and its impact on economic growth.  
There are two counteracting tendencies that should be taken into account when 
interpreting welfare gains. First, even the ‘hard’ Brexit scenario would not cause 
                                                                                                                                                        
EU, the UK will find the behaviour of its leading non-European trade partners more benign.” Financial 
Times, “Bombardier exposes post-Brexit realities”, September 28, 2017 by Tony Barber. 
5 “Whitehall is planning to hire another 2,000 staff to deal specifically with Brexit in a sign of how its 
resources are being diverted towards the challenges of leaving the EU.” Financial Times, “Ministers 
haggle over 2,000 new staff as Brexit tests civil service”, October 12, 2017, by Jim Pickard and George 
Parker. 
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abrupt welfare losses and the catastrophic decline of trade flows between the EU and 
UK. These changes would occur gradually. However, RTAs (especially CUs and the 
EU in particular) had the strongest trade creating effect over the last 50 years, which 
would indicate that the welfare losses from Brexit are likely to be higher and the 
welfare gains of TTIP would increase over time. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of 
the evolution of the multilateral framework and the mega-regionals in the context of 
the UK. Section 3 discusses potential trade policy scenarios. Section 4 outlines the 
methodology and data, where Section 5 discusses the results of the analysis. Section 
6 performs robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Multilateral negotiations and mega-regionals 
 
History plays an important role in determining trade (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1998). 
Krasner (1976) emphasised the role of past decisions and policies, with particular 
reference to the UK and US as architects of the international trade structure. In the 
aftermath of World War II (WWII) the trade environment featured entrenched 
protectionist positions, following the market failure of the inter-war years (Irwin, 
2011). The best case of global free trade, as proposed by neoclassical trade 
economists, was infeasible. Hence, national objectives including economic growth 
and political power were key issues. By the end of WWII, the UK’s position as the 
dominant global trade power was overtaken by the US. During this period, there was 
a broad acceptance of the ‘trade promotes peace’ hypothesis (Anderton and Carter, 
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2001; Hull, 1948). Therefore, these two powerful states attempted to balance their 
interests in terms of political strength and a desire for global stability. Hence, reeling 
from conflict, the states looked to reduce trade barriers. However, perhaps 
inevitably, they remained unable to ignore national interests (Mavroidis et al., 2009).  
 Multilateralism held considerable appeal for policy makers looking to reverse 
the economic failures of the inter-war period. This was both in terms of promoting 
peace as well as swifter liberalisation than what was likely from negotiating separate 
bilateral deals. The US and UK policy makers dominated discussions that led to the 
signing of the GATT, the precursor to the WTO (Toye, 2003). A range of concerns, 
including imperial preferences and promotion of the capitalist model, promoted 
legitimising FTAs and CUs within the GATT (Article XXIV, GATT). Despite the 
concessions regarding imperial preferences, from the 1950s, UK trade reoriented 
away from their (former) colonies towards European trade partners (Anderson and 
Norheim, 1993). More generally, Article XXIV permitted the segmentation of the 
world into overlapping trading blocks, where almost every country is a member of at 
least one RTA. Multilateral negotiations initially focussed on tariffs then as the 
attention moved towards NTBs, and regulation in particular, agreements proved 
more difficult. Low (2015) argued that the Article XXIV concession was pivotal. 
Therefore, this original compromise is key to understanding the current issues facing 
the WTO. 
 Recently, the WTO has struggled to provide an effective multilateral negotiating 
framework (Azevêdo, 2016; Froman, 2015; Wilkinson, 2002). This vacuum and the 
emergence of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries as 
key players in the global economy provided fertile ground for the development of 
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the mega-regionals (Figure 1). These new groupings provide a much greater 
challenge to the WTO than their predecessors, which were geographically localised 
and considerably smaller. Furthermore, the mega-regionals are looking to address 
regulatory barriers, which have proved difficult to deal with on a multilateral basis. 
The WTO’s inability to meaningfully regulate RTAs, where the seed was sown 
during the inception of the GATT, suggests that the WTO will not block the 
formation of the mega-regionals. Moreover, there are suggestions that the WTO may 
view mega-regions as a stepping-stone towards multilateral liberalisation (Schott, 
2014). 
 Negotiating these blocks requires large-scale trade diplomacy and prolonged 
discussions. This makes the US’s recent withdrawal from the TPP and suspension of 
the TTIP talks particularly unwelcome. Since WWII, the key players have shifted 
from the US and UK to the US and China. The US is witnessing a decline in its 
position, not unlike the UK in the early 20th century. Where the UK attempted to 
retain its strong position by arguing for imperial preferences, similarly, the US is 
looking to its historical partnerships (and potentially, mega-deals) to tackle the 
growing strength of China. However, we should not underestimate the importance 
of the EU trading bloc, where Fan et al. (2014) use network analysis to find that 
disconnecting EU exports from Japan or the US would lead to the collapse of the 
world trade system.  Therefore, the mega-regionals/blocs have formed an important 
part of the geopolitical ‘game’. These mega arrangements are likely to impose rules 
on those countries outside the blocks, suggesting that been outside one of the three 
clubs could prove costly (Li et al., 2016). 
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The EU also shares the US concerns regarding the growing importance of 
China. They have been engaged in extensive negotiations towards a new China-EU 
Investment Agreement, which may turn into a China-EU FTA. Furthermore, EU 
members fear a US-Asia powerhouse from which they would be excluded. The TPP 
was signed 4 February 2016, providing an incentive for the TTIP negotiations to 
forge ahead (until recently). The main points of contention include agricultural 
subsidies, services (i.e. audio and visual, financial), food safety and environment, 
labour standards, investor-to-state dispute settlement system and public 
procurement. EU and US levels of GDP and trade make this a formidable 
arrangement (Akhtar and Jones, 2014). However, the process has been plagued with 
controversy, leaving the Commission to insist that they are engaging with the public 
as openly as possible (Malmström, 2015). Supporters of the TTIP claim that it may 
raise welfare in the EU and US through increases in productivity and higher 
consumer surplus. Opponents argue that the welfare gains would be small, while the 
effects on standards in the labour market, health and safety in product markets, and 
environmental standards may outweigh the benefits (Pitlik, 2016). 
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Figure 1: Mega-regionals 
 
Source: Authors work 
 
Notes:  
1/ TPP: countries only included in this mega-regional arrangement  
2/ TTIP: countries only included in this mega-regional arrangement  
3/ TPP and TTIP: countries included in both arrangements  
4/ RCEP: countries only included in this mega-regional arrangement  
5/ TPP and RCEP: countries included in both arrangements 
 
 Meanwhile, UK trade negotiations have been integrated and subsumed within 
the EU. EU member states, including the UK, monitor and assist the EU Commission 
but are not permitted to conduct independent trade negotiations. Whereas, trade 
missions to extra-EU countries involving business-to-business (B2B) dialogues are 
targeted at internationalising firms. Therefore, Brexit presents the UK government 
with significant challenges including increasing capacity within the Department for 
International Trade (previously UK Trade and Investment, until July 2016).   This 
newly formed department will need to address rising costs through trade preference 
erosion as well as the UK being a less attractive destination for investment. This 
situation has been further exacerbated by the recent UK election results, which 
provide an even more questionable basis for exit negotiations. In the face of such 
difficulties it is somewhat predictable that the Commonwealth is mentioned. The 
 
 10 
Commonwealth remains but re-establishing it as a strong preferential trading club 
headed by the UK, or the UK signing of a collection of bilateral FTAs, may prove 
difficult (Figure 2). After WWII, the UK defence of imperial preferences was seen by 
some as a desperate attempt to maintain a powerful position in the world-trading 
environment. In fact, it was increasingly the case that the UK relied on the colonies, 
particularly during WWII (Lee, 1977). More recently, the situation has worsened; 
with African countries becoming reticent to sign up to EU trade deals as well as 
accusations of such deals being a type of colonialism6. At the same time, India is 
backing their ‘Buy in India’ programme rather than looking to a new deal with the 
UK7. In summary, the relevance of Commonwealth nostalgia for post-Brexit UK 
trade deals is questionable. Therefore, the UK is struggling to retain a powerful 
position in the world-trading environment. A key feature of this power-play is the 
TTIP and the possibility of a US-UK FTA. At the same time there is the complex and 
emotive issue of the UK relationship with the EU, whether this is a ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ 
Brexit. 
 
                                                     
6 On 26 Feb 2017, Tanzanian President John Magufuli held a joint press conference with visiting 
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni where he described the Economic Partnership Agreement with 
the EU as a form of colonialism. 
7 Public Procurement (Preference to Make in India), Order 2017 was issued on 15 June 2017 
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Figure 2: Members of the commonwealth 
Source: Authors work 
 
3. Trade policy scenarios: interaction of mega-regionals with 
other agreements and impact on third countries 
 
By lowering tariffs and eliminating non-tariff measures, bilateral and plulateral trade 
agreements increase national welfare due to allocation and accumulation effects 
(Baldwin & Venables, 1995). We mainly focus on the effect of redistribution of trade 
caused by the interplay of TTIP and Brexit, but briefly consider the effect of changes 
in resource costs due to elimination/introduction of NTMs (Baldwin et al., 1997). 
 Once countries join the TTIP by virtue of EU membership, third countries are 
expected to experience from trade diversion and trade preference erosion. Countries 
outside the EU will find it difficult to negotiate similar or better terms. Furthermore, 
if mega-regional blocs expand their membership to new countries this could generate 
increased costs of being outside the EU. We examine a number of scenarios in terms 
of the UK relationship with the EU and the outcome of the TTIP negotiations: 
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1. EU&TTIP: UK remains a member of the EU and the TTIP is signed (Scenario 
1) 
2. Brexit&TTIP: UK exits the EU and the TTIP is  signed (Scenario 2) 
3. Brexit: UK exits the EU and the TTIP is not signed (Scenario 3) 
In addition, we consider two post-Brexit scenarios, which are discussed as alternative 
UK policies in order to mitigate consequences of Brexit: 
4. UK&US: UK exits the EU and successfully negotiates an FTA with the US 
(Scenario 4) 
5. Commonwealth FTA: UK exits the EU and signs FTAs with the largest 
Commonwealth countries: Australia, Canada, India, Nigeria, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, and South Africa (Scenario 5) 
The last two scenarios are chosen to investigate the validity of a popular claim that 
the UK has an opportunity to compensate the losses in the European markets by 
freely negotiating FTAs with non-European countries. 
We model the UK exiting the EU under soft Brexit and ‘hard’ Brexit scenarios. 
Under the ‘hard’ Brexit, the UK would not be able to maintain preferential tariffs with 
the EU, and will instead face the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) rates. We also assume 
that the NTBs applied to UK exporters would be similar to those applied to exporters 
from outside the EU free trade zone. Furthermore, in terms of the TTIP, we assume 
that the effect of the arrangement would be typical of the FTAs signed over the period 
1960-2014. Therefore, to model the effect of the TTIP we rely on our estimates of the 
average effect of RTAs during 1960-2014. 
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4. Methodology and Data 
 
The underlying model for our analysis is a structural ‘new trade theory’ model 
(Helpman et al., 2008), which captures selection into positive bilateral trading 
partners and the effect of trade policy on extensive and intensive margins of trade. 
As pointed out by Head and Mayer (2014), the structural gravity model is consistent 
with a wide class of models, including Armington (1969), Krugman (1980), and 
Melitz (2003). This model has been used to estimate the effect of preferential trade 
agreements (Egger et al., 2011). 
 Trade flows are determined by 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 =
𝑌𝑖𝐸𝑗
Ω𝑖𝑃𝑗
𝜑𝑖𝑗    (1) 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is exports from country i to country j, 𝑌𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗  is total production in 
country i and 𝐸𝑗 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑖  is total expenditure in country j. Ω𝑖 = ∑
𝜑𝑖𝑗𝐸𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑗  is outward 
multilateral resistance and P𝑗 = ∑
𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑌𝑖
Ω𝑖
𝑖  is the inward multilateral resistance term.
8 
Furthermore, 𝜑𝑖𝑗 represents bilateral trade costs, which are influenced by the choice 
of trade policy. Our bilateral trade costs are given by 
ln𝜑𝑖𝑗 = ln𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑗 + 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝑍𝑖𝑗γ + 𝑢𝑖𝑗   (2) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the logarithm of bilateral distance between trading partners i and j, 
𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑗  is a dummy variable representing EU membership status, 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 is a dummy 
                                                     
8 When a large economy or trade block changes its policy towards another country, it influences 
bilateral trade directly and the trade of other countries indirectly. However, the indirect effect can be 
large. For instance, Russia introduced an embargo on imports of food from the EU in 2014. This action 
was in response to economic sanctions and it lead to the growth of food imports from countries that did 
not support the sanctions.  Anecdotal evidence suggest that this policy allowed countries such as 
Belarus, which is landlocked, to export shrimps and salmon to Russia. At the same time, sales of 
Norwegian salmon to Belarus increased by 50 percent, where a large proportion was re-exported to 
Russia under new label of “Belorussian” salmon (Newsweek, “Busting a few lox”, 19, 09/04/2015). 
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variable representing the presence (or otherwise) of an RTA and 𝑍𝑖𝑗 denotes other 
variables influencing trade costs (e.g. common language, common legal system, 
colonial relationship). 
 Our empirical strategy proceeds in two stages. The first stage involves modelling 
the selection into trade partners as well as estimating the trade elasticities with 
respect to trade policy variables. To estimate extensive and intensive trade elasticities 
with respect to trade policies, we follow Egger et al. (2011). This procedure allows us 
to estimate a structural model with responses to trade policy at extensive and 
intensive margins. It also addresses the issue of zero trade flows and provides 
unbiased estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity. The second step uses 
simulations by means of a structural gravity approach to model the alternative 
scenarios/counterfactuals outlined above. We compute welfare gains/losses of each 
of the scenarios compared to the status quo. Therefore, we examine changes in real 
income using results derived by Arkolakis et al. (2012) and the structural gravity 
equation (1). 
4.1. Modelling the selection into trading partners and estimating trade policy 
effects 
 
We first deal with the sample selection correction. Some countries are more likely to 
trade than others and the probability of positive trade flows depends on fixed and 
variable trade costs. Therefore, we estimate a probit model to explore 𝑇𝑖𝑗,𝑡, the 
probability of positive trade flows between i and j: 
𝑇𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = Pr(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 1|. ) = Φ(𝐻𝑖𝑗,𝑡Γ
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒) (3) 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is a binary variable that takes value of 1 if we observe positive trade 
flows and zero otherwise, 𝐻𝑖𝑗,𝑡 denotes policy variables (RTA and EU) as well as the 
 15 
determinants of fixed and variable trade costs including distance, common border, 
common spoken language, common legal system and year fixed effects. The 
exclusion restriction that we exploit is common religion, which is customary in the 
literature. We further form variables that control for the selection into positive trade 
flows and heterogeneity of exporting firms (Helpman et al., 2008): 
?̂?𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = Φ(𝐻𝑖𝑗,𝑡Γ̂
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒) = Φ(ẑ𝑖𝑗,𝑡) (4) 
?̂?𝑖𝑗,𝑡 =
ϕ(ẑ𝑖𝑗,𝑡)
Φ(ẑ𝑖𝑗,𝑡)
   (5) 
ẑ̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = ẑ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖𝑗,𝑡  (6) 
 Next, we augment the gravity equation (1), by using ?̂?, a third degree 
polynomial of ẑ̅, as well as introducing a full set of exporter-time, importer-time and 
bilateral fixed effects to control for multilateral resistance terms: 
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾3?̂?𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚+3(
3
𝑚=1 ẑ̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡)
𝑚 + 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑗𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡 (7) 
We estimate (7) using a panel of bilateral export and import data from 1960-2014 for 
162 countries. The length of the sample and larger cross-section of countries 
distinguishes our estimation from both Felbermayr et al. (2015) and Dhingra et al. 
(2017). It gives us more time and cross-section variation in order to pin down the 
effects of RTAs in general and EU in particular on trade. It also gives us an 
opportunity to look at dynamics and trends in the effect of RTAs on trade. We 
overcome the computational issue of dealing with 36,000 fixed effects by applying an 
algorithm developed by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010). 
4.2. Accounting for endogenous RTA formation 
 
The outlined procedure captures heterogeneity of country-pairs, controls for 
country-time specific effects and accounts for the selection into trading partners. 
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However, it does not deal with endogeneity of trade policy. A decision to sign an 
RTA is driven by bilateral relationships between countries that may evolve over 
time. Moreover, it is influenced by trade costs. Ignoring the selection into RTA 
partners is likely to bias downwards the estimation of the effect of an RTA on trade 
(Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).9 We deal with this issue by modelling the selection into 
RTA and EU partners as well as further instrumenting our policy variables with 
obtained selection probabilities. We estimate the probit models of RTA and EU 
formation as follows: 
𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑅𝑇𝐴 = Pr(𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 1|. ) = Φ(𝐺𝑖𝑗,𝑡Γ
𝑅𝑇𝐴) (8) 
𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐸𝑈 = Pr(𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 1|. ) = Φ(𝐺𝑖𝑗,𝑡Γ
𝐸𝑈) (9) 
where 𝐺𝑖𝑗,𝑡 captures fixed and variable trade costs including distance, common 
border, common spoken language and common legal system. In addition, for (9) we 
include an indicator variable, whether both countries are located in Europe since 
joining EU is only allowed for European countries. We then re-estimate model (7) 
using instrumental variables method, where RTA and EU variables are instrumented 
by predicted values of 𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑅𝑇𝐴and 𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐸𝑈 and the inverse Mill’s ratios. 
4.3. Simulations 
 
Once we have estimated the RTA and EU impact on trade, we start the simulation 
part of our analysis. Following Anderson et al. (2015), we estimate a structural 
gravity model using 2012 data and applying the Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood estimator (PPML estimator, see Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).  We constrain 
                                                     
9 The downward bias occurs if high, unobserved bilateral trade costs makes an RTA more likely. 
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the coefficients of the policy and selection variables to be equal to our estimated 
coefficients from the previous stage. Our estimated model is given by  
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = exp(𝛾1𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑡+?̂?2𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾3?̂? + ∑ 𝛾𝑚+3(
3
𝑚=1 ẑ̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡)
𝑚 + 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝜋 + 𝜒𝑖 + 𝜉𝑗) + 𝜐𝑖𝑗     (10) 
where 𝑍𝑖𝑗 are bilateral trade costs variables including distance, common border, 
colonial links, common legal origin, common spoken language and common religion. 
Using result by Fally (2015), we compute the inward and outward multilateral 
resistance terms according to the following expressions:  
?̂?𝑗
1−𝜎 = 𝐸𝑗 exp(−𝜉𝑗) /𝐸0   (11) 
Ω̂𝑖
1−𝜎 = 𝐸0𝑌𝑖exp⁡(−?̂?𝑖)    (12) 
where 𝐸0 is the level of expenditure in the country for which the inward multilateral 
resistance is normalized to 𝑃0 = 1.
10 
 The model is further re-estimated with modified policy variables 𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗  and 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ , which switch on and off according to various scenarios, as well as the inward 
and outward multilateral resistance terms re-calculated with new fixed effects, ?̂?𝑖
∗ 
and 𝜉𝑗
∗, according to the expressions (11) and (12). 
4.3.1. Conditional Effects of TTIP and Brexit 
 
Conditional effects of a change in policy, (i.e. the UK exiting the EU or the EU 
signing the TTIP) are modelled by modifying policy variables to reflect the expected 
policy changes, taking the income and expenditure of countries, 𝑌𝑖 and 𝐸𝑗, as given.
11  
This approach highlights the changes in trade patterns due to the changes in the 
corresponding trade costs caused by policy changes. Therefore, it does not rely on 
                                                     
10 In our estimation, Afghanistan is the reference country. Welfare changes are estimated relative to 
Afghanistan. 
11 Head and Mayer (2014) label this approach as Modular Trade Impact (MTI). 
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any other channels of economic changes required for gains/losses to materialize. The 
limitations of this approach are as follows. First, it assumes that the effect of the TTIP 
is equal to the average effect of the RTAs in the past. Second, it shuts down the 
effects that the TTIP and UK exit from the EU may have on production, technology, 
employment and relative wages. Third, it does not account for welfare gains caused 
by saving resources due to NTM removal. Fourth, it does not account for the effect 
on non-tradables and services. We further discuss and address these issues in the 
robustness checks section. 
4.3.2. Evaluating welfare  
 
We compute changes in direction and value of trade and evaluate welfare changes 
according to the following:  
?̂?𝑖
𝐶𝐸 = 100% ×
(
 
 
𝑌𝑖
∗
?̂?𝑖
∗⁄
𝑌𝑖
?̂?𝑖
⁄
− 1
)
 
 
= 100% × (
?̂?𝑖
?̂?𝑖
∗ − 1)  (13) 
where 𝑖 = 1,2,3,4,5 are policy scenarios described in the previous section. The last 
equality is due to the fact that in the conditional scenario we keep outputs and 
expenditures constant.12 
4.4. Data 
 
Our dataset covers 162 countries for 1960-2014.  Aggregate bilateral exports and 
imports measured in thousands of current US dollars are taken from the Direction of 
                                                     
12 It is worth mentioning that our welfare results does not depend on the choice of the reference country. 
Since we keep expenditure levels of all countries constant, welfare changes are given by the ratio of 
exponentiated fixed effects in the status quo and counterfactual scenarios:  
?̂?𝑖
?̂?𝑖
∗ =
exp(−?̂?𝑖)
exp(−?̂?𝑖
∗)
. Also, this 
formula is consistent with a wide class of models, including a Melitz model with heterogeneous firms, 
which was the basis for our first-stage estimation.  
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Trade Statistics (DOTS) provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To 
compute welfare gains, data on internal trade is required. We approximate internal 
trade as given by 
𝑋𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠) × 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 −∑𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
+∑𝑋𝑗𝑖
𝑗≠𝑖
 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 is the share of services in GDP, ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖  is total export of country i, and 
∑ 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑗≠𝑖  is total import of country i.
13 
 RTA data are taken from the Centre D'Etudes Prospectives et D'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) database and updated to 2014 using the WTO database of 
regional trade agreements. RTA is a binary variable that takes value of 1 if a country-
pair has an active RTA agreement in place (including the EU agreement) and 0 
otherwise. In addition, we introduce a binary variable ‘EU’ that takes value of 1 if 
both trading countries are EU members and 0 otherwise. A positive and significant 
coefficient of the EU variable would indicate that the EU generates more trade 
relative to the other trade agreements. We complement the RTA data with Mario 
Larch’s Regional Trade Agreements Database from Egger and Larch (2008). This data 
allows us to distinguish between different types of RTAs, such as FTAs and CUs. 
Finally, data on applied tariff rates is collected from the TRAINS database for the 
period 2003-2013. 
 The data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in current US dollars and total 
population are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2014 published by the 
World Bank. Geographical characteristics and distance between countries are taken 
                                                     
13 Data on the share of services in GDP in 2012 is taken from the World Bank. In several cases, when the 
data for 2012 is not available, the latest available data is taken. 
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from CEPII, (see Head et al. (2010) for a detailed description of the data). Colony and 
contiguity dummy variables are used to control for pair-specific trade costs that are 
not directly related to distance. Furthermore, the dummy representing common legal 
origin captures the compatibility of the legal systems of trading partners and 
captures trade costs related to the signing of contracts.  The common spoken 
language and common religion dummy variables capture the effect of cultural 
similarities on trade (Melitz and Toubal, 2014). 
 We carefully record both positive and zero trade flows for both exports and 
imports, while distinguishing zero trade flows from missing data. Some countries, 
such as the USSR, ceased to exist within this period. Our dataset does not contain the 
bilateral trade of these countries. However, trade of newly created states, such as 
Russia and Ukraine, is recorded since the date of their creation. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
We present our empirical results according to the sequence of the discussion 
outlined in the previous section. 
5.1. Selection into positive trade and RTA partners 
 
We begin with the selection into trade and preferential trading partners. Table 1 
reports estimates of these selection processes, where columns (1) and (2) refer to the 
selection into exporting while controlling for RTA/EU and FTA/CU, respectively. 
Columns (3) and (4) explore the determinants of the selection into regional 
trading/economic blocks, while columns (5) and (6) look at the differences in 
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selection between FTA and CU.14 For each model we report marginal effects 
estimated using the average values of the explanatory variables. We find that an RTA 
is positively associated with probability of exporting and importing. An RTA 
increases the probability of positive exports by 17 percent. This aligns with our 
expectations given that one of the main goals of trade agreements is to ease market 
access. Moreover, EU membership is positively associated with the probability of 
trade, but the effect is not significant. The effect is more pronounced for a CU, while 
an FTA increases probability of trade by only 9.8 percent. This may reflect the fact 
that a CU goes beyond reductions in applied tariffs and eliminates NTMs as well, 
which in the era of low tariffs play a more prominent role in shaping trade flows. 
 Positive trade is more likely if countries share a common spoken language and a 
common colonial past. Higher levels of production in exporting countries and a 
higher level of expenditure in importing countries are also positively linked to the 
probability of trade. On the other hand, higher levels of population are negatively 
linked to probability of trade, which among other things reflects a home market 
effect. We also find a negative effect of common religion on trade (conditional on 
controlling for common language, colonial past, etc.), which may be capturing the 
fact that more similar countries have less incentive to trade. 
 According to the model in column (3), the probability of creating an RTA is 
positively linked to a common spoken language and the economic size of exporting 
and importing countries. Yet, it is negatively linked to a common border, sharing the 
same religion and a larger population. The probability of EU membership in column 
                                                     
14 For instance, Lake & Yildiz (2016) argue that over longer distances FTA is preferable to CU. 
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(4) is positively related to a common legal system and larger economic size. The 
effect of economic size on being a member of the EU for both exporting and 
importing countries is about four times larger than the effect of forming a common 
RTA. 
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Table 1: Selection models 
 Selection into 
bilateral trading 
partners 
RTA and EU 
selection 
FTA and CU 
selection 
 RTA/EU FTA/CU RTA EU FTA CU 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RTA .170**      
 (.011)      
EU .073      
 (.042)      
FTA  .098**     
  (.009)     
CU  .184**     
  (.010)     
Both in Europe    .013**   
    (.001)   
Com. border .024 .020 -.003* -.007** -.007** -.004** 
 (.022) (.021) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) 
Colonial past .165**  -.002 -.004* .006* -.002 
 (.022)  (.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) 
Com. legal .006 .007* .001 .002* .000 .000 
 (.003) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
Com. religion -.049** -.050** -.009** .001 -.000 -.003** 
 (.006) (.006) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Com. language .269** .268** .016** .003 .024** .010** 
 (.007) (.007) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
ln 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 -.116** -.111** -.021** -.008** -.020** -.012** 
 (.002) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 .105** .106** .003** .006** .006** -.001** 
 (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
ln 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 -.017** -.018** -.002** -.004** -.004** .001** 
 (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 .081** .082** .003** .006** .006** -.001** 
 (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
ln 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡 -.009** -.010** -.002** -.004** -.004** .001** 
 (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Observations 965973 965973 965973 965973 965973 965973 
Notes: ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at 5% level. Marginal effects estimated at average values are 
reported. Standard errors clustered at country-pair in brackets. All models are estimated by probit. Columns (1) 
and (2) report selection into exporting country-pairs. Columns (3) and (4) report selection into RTA/EU country-
pairs. Columns (5) and (6) report selection into FTA/CU country-pairs. All models are estimated for 162 
countries in 1960-2014. 
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 FTA is more likely to be created between countries sharing colonial past, while it 
is not a significant determinant of CU formation (columns (5) and (6)). Common 
language is important for all types of RTAs, but is relatively more important for FTA 
formation, while common religion has a negative and significant effect on CU 
formation. 
Table 2: Long-term gravity estimates 
 RTA and EU FTA and 
CU 
Applied 
tariff 
 FE Selection IV PPML   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RTA .353** .562** 1.242** .100**  -.034 
 (.026) (.053) (.103) (.028)  (.059) 
EU .656** .630** .582** .382**  .437** 
 (.040) (.043) (.110) (.035)  (.053) 
FTA     .296**  
     (.037)  
CU     .928**  
     (.065)  
Applied tariff       -1.025** 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡)      (.136) 
𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑡  2.497**   2.625** 1.357** 
  (.120)   (.121) (.264) 
𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡  3.455**   3.384** 3.171** 
  (.228)   (.232) (.465) 
𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
2   -1.242**   -1.253** -.856** 
  (.074)   (.074) (.145) 
𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
3   .130**   .135** .078** 
  (.008)   (.008) (.015) 
Observations 579989 537390 537390 971189 537390 266554 
𝑅2 .864 .870 .868 .992 .871 .906 
Notes: ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at 5% level. Standard errors clustered at country-pair in 
brackets. All models are estimated with a full set of country-pair, exporter-year, and importer-year fixed effects. To 
deal with high dimensionality problem of adding more than 36,000 fixed effects, we use the algorithm developed by 
Guimaraes et al. (2010). Dependent variable in all models except (4) is ln(exp). Dependent variable in (4) is exp. 
Models (1)-(5) are estimated for 162 countries in 1960-2014. Model (6) is estimated for 162 countries in 1993-
2014.  
 
5.2. Long-run RTA elasticity of trade 
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Table 2 presents estimates of the effects of trade policy on exports at intensive 
margins. We control for exporter-year, importer-year, and country-pair time 
invariant effects. Standard errors are clustered by country-pair. Columns (1)-(4) 
present results for all types of RTAs. In column (1) we do not control for selection 
and heteroskedasticity driven by firm-level heterogeneity. In this case, on average, 
signing an RTA increases trade by 35.3 percent. Joining the EU will have even 
stronger trade-creating effect, additionally boosting exports by 65.6 percent. These 
numbers are slightly higher than are typically found in other studies (see Head and 
Mayer, 2014 for a meta-analysis of the effect of RTAs on trade). In column (2), we 
account for heterogeneity of firms and the mechanism of selection of firms into 
exporters. The results remain significant, while the RTA coefficient has higher value. 
Variables controlling for firm level heterogeneity are all significant and of expected 
sign and magnitude (see Table 2 in Helpman et al., 2008). Finally, in column (3) we 
present results of IV estimation, which noticeably increases the estimates of the 
effects of the policy variables, RTA in particular. This effect is well-documented in 
the literature, which finds that not accounting for endogeneity of trade policy 
considerably biases the estimates of trade policy variables downwards (Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2007). In fact, our estimate of the RTA coefficient is remarkably close to 
the estimate in Felbermayr et al. (2014), which equals 1.21. We also estimate the 
gravity mode by the PPML method, which produced smaller coefficients of the effect 
of RTAs and EU on trade.  This fact is also well-documented, as discussed in Head & 
Mayer (2014). In order to account for a range of coefficient estimates for RTA and EU 
variables, we perform a sensitivity analysis in the robustness checks section. 
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5.3. Tariff and non-tariff measures: comparison of FTA and CU elasticity of 
trade 
 
We also report the effects of different types of RTAs – FTA vs CU – in column (5). 
The effect of CU on trade is much stronger, which is consistent with the fact that CU 
goes much deeper than a FTA and removes non-tariff barriers to trade, while FTAs 
are mostly focused on reduction of applied tariffs. In fact, once we control for the 
level of tariffs, the positive effect of RTAs disappears, while the effect of the EU on 
trade remains strongly positive and significant. We will use these results later when 
we discuss the differences in the effects of tariffs vs non-tariff measures and contrast 
FTAs and CUs. 
5.4. Dynamic effect of RTA and hysteresis 
 
Two important issues need to be addressed in order to understand the dynamics of 
transition between steady states. First, little is known about the dynamics of the 
impact of an RTA on bilateral trade flows. Does it boost trade at the early stage or 
does it increase trade gradually? Second, even less is known about the effect of 
withdrawal from a trade agreement. Is it symmetric and opposite in size? Does the 
RTA effect immediately disappear or linger over time?  
We start our discussion with the second of these issues. There are not many 
examples countries walking away from a trade agreement in recent times. However, 
the study of Head, Mayers and Ries (2010) on the dynamics of trade of former 
colonies with their metropoles provides us with some insights.15 Its main finding is 
                                                     
15 Another example, which confirm this pattern, is the breakup of the Soviet Union, which led to 
dramatic reduction in bilateral trade between former USSR republics and to overall economic decline 
(Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 2003). 
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in favour of a strong hysteresis effect of the RTAs. The decline in bilateral trade 
between the metropole and its colony is gradual, but very substantial.  It drops to 
35% of the initial level within 30-40 years. Also, there is a similar decline in bilateral 
trade with the other colonies of the same metropole. Finally, there is an overall 
decline in trade of about 20% after independence. One explanation of these patterns 
may be that the metropole has trade policy capacity and expertise that is commonly 
shared with its colonies. Once the colony gets independence, it loses access to this 
facility, which has negative effect on its trade with all countries.  
To answer the question about the dynamics of the RTA effect, we perform the 
analysis, similar to Head, Mayer, and Reis (2010). For each bilateral trade agreement, 
we establish its starting point and include the interaction terms of the RTA variable 
with its duration. Duration is categorized from 1 to 40 years.16  We do the same for 
our EU variable. As an alternative specification, we also consider whether the effect 
of an RTA varies over time, by interacting the RTA variable with decade indicators. 
The average effects on trade for RTA/EU members relative to non-members, in 
percent, are presented in Figure 3.  
Several important regularities emerge. First, the positive effect of RTAs 
accumulates over time with some acceleration for RTAs over 25 years old. Second, 
both RTA and, in particular, EU are currently having the strongest impact on trade 
over the period 1960-2014. It follows from the first effect and recent surge in RTA 
formation, but may also reinforce itself as more and more countries rely on RTAs. 
 
                                                     
16 We include all RTAs with duration above 40 years in the same category. 
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Figure 3: Dynamics of RTA and EU in 1960-2014 
 
We repeat the same exercise to study FTA and CU agreements separately. CUs have 
the same pattern as RTAs in general (see Figure 4). However, FTAs have a much 
weaker and shorter trade creation effect, which reaches its maximum after 12 years 
from its formation and rapidly declines after that. FTAs had the strongest trade 
creation effect in the 00’s, and are currently experience a downward trend, while the 
trade creating effect of the CUs accelerates and is currently at its peak.  
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Figure 4: Dynamics of FTA vs CU 
 
 
5.5. Counterfactual scenarios: trade flows and welfare gains 
 
As the benchmark, we take the estimated effects of the trade policy from column (2) 
of Table 2 as given and estimate the effects of changes in trade policy of the UK on its 
exports and imports, following the constrained PPML methodology outlined in the 
previous section. The benchmark estimation and simulations are performed using a 
2012 sample; while we would like to use most recent data to evaluate the effects of 
policy changes, unfortunately the data for 2013 and 2014 has gaps. In what follows, 
we present predictions and welfare gains based on the PPML simulation exercise. 
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Table 3: UK actual exports, imports, and counterfactual changes by regions in 2012 
Region Status Quo, TTIP & TTIP & No TTIP US UK CMWTH 
  bln. USD EU, % 
Brexit, 
% 
Brexit, 
% FTA, % FTA, % 
 
A. Export from UK 
EU 230.35 -5.9 -38.1 -36.7 -39.7 -37.1 
US 45.76 46.8 -0.3 7.8 68.3 3.7 
Rest of the World 132.2 -10.1 3.1 6.8 -1.4 23.2 
All countries 408.31 
     
 
B. Import to UK 
EU 347.7 -4.8 -33.8 -31.7 -33.6 -33.0 
US 54.86 54 9.3 14.1 80.7 7.9 
Rest of the World 257.03 -6.4 10.3 12.3 6.2 24.9 
All countries 659.59 
     Notes: Table reports actual exports and imports of UK in 2012 in USD to different groups of countries and 
counterfactual changes relative to the status quo levels in percent. We assume that a “shallow” FTA is in place. 
 Panel A of Table 3 presents changes in exports under the five scenarios. The first 
column presents the status quo exports of the UK to EU, US and the Rest of the 
World in 2012. The other five columns report percentage changes from the status quo 
levels of exports for the five specified scenarios. Relative to the status quo, signing 
the TTIP and remaining in the EU would increase British exports to the US by 46.8 
percent (20.9 billion USD). It also would lower exports to the EU by 5.9 percent (13.5 
billion USD) and the rest of the world by 10.1 percent (13.3 billion USD). This result 
illustrates the trade diversion caused by lowering trade barriers towards UK goods 
sold in the US. Brexit combined with free trade between the US and EU would lower 
exports from the UK to the EU by 38.1 percent, while the UK exports to the US will 
remain almost unchanged.17 Furthermore, UK exports to the rest of the World would 
increase by 3.1 percent. If the TTIP is not signed and the UK still leaves the EU, this 
would cause a similar drop of exports to the EU, and increase in exports to the US 
                                                     
17 Teulings (2017), who studied how Brexit influences exports found similar results. 
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and Rest of the World by 7.8 and 6.8 percent respectively. If the UK negotiates an 
FTA with the US after Brexit, it would boost its exports to the UK by 68.3 percent. In 
case of FTAs with 6 large Commonwealth countries, the UK expands its exports to 
the rest of the world by 23.2 percent.  
 Panel B of Table 3 presents changes in British imports under the five scenarios. 
These results are quite similar to the results for the UK exports since we consider 
reciprocal trade liberalization; hence, trade barriers are reduced identically for both 
exports and imports. Relative to the status quo, signing the TTIP and remaining in 
the EU would increase British imports from US by 54 percent. It also would lower 
imports from the EU by 4.8 percent or by 16.7 billion USD. Brexit would lower UK 
imports from the EU by 32-34 percent or by 115-118 billion USD.  
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Table 4: Main welfare results 
Elast. of subst. Welfare gains, % 
  
TTIP EU TTIP Brexit 
No TTIP 
and Brexit 
US UK FTA 
CMWTH 
FTA 
      
 
A. Baseline results, “Shallow FTA EU/UK”, Table 2 column (2) 
4 0.23 -3.97 -3.49 -2.66 -2.56 
5 0.17 -2.99 -2.63 -2 -1.93 
6 0.14 -2.4 -2.11 -1.61 -1.54 
Average 0.18 -3.12 -2.74 -2.09 -2.01 
      
      
 
B. ‘Hard’ Brexit, Table 2 column (2) 
4 0.23 -6.71 -6.32 -5.47 -5.24 
5 0.17 -5.08 -4.78 -4.13 -3.96 
6 0.14 -4.08 -3.84 -3.32 -3.18 
Average  0.18 -5.29 -4.98 -4.31 -4.13 
      
 
C. Only intensive margins, “Shallow FTA EU/UK”, Table 2 column 
(1) 
4 0.17 -3.75 -3.46 -2.92 -2.81 
5 0.13 -2.83 -2.61 -2.2 -2.11 
6 0.1 -2.27 -2.09 -1.76 -1.69 
Average  0.13 -2.95 -2.72 -2.3 -2.2 
      
 
D. IV results, “Shallow FTA EU/UK”, Table 2 column (3) 
4 0.85 -5.56 -3.84 -0.73 -0.72 
5 0.63 -4.2 -2.9 -0.54 -0.54 
6 0.51 -3.37 -2.32 -0.44 -0.43 
Average 0.66 -4.38 -3.02 -0.57 -0.56 
Notes: Table presents a representative consumer welfare gains or losses due to 5 counterfactual scenarios. The 
gains and losses are measured relative to the status quo of the UK as a member of EU and no TTIP is signed. 
Computations are performed for different levels of sigma, which is elasticity of substitution parameter in the utility 
function. 
 
 Table 4 compares consumer welfare estimated according to (13) under different 
scenarios and different levels of elasticity of substitution. According to Head and 
Mayer (2014), 622 studies that used a structural gravity approach found an average 
value of σ = 5.13. We have chosen three levels of sigma: σ=4, σ=5 and σ=6. Panel A 
reports the results for RTA and EU estimated effects taken from Table 2, column (2). 
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It assumes a shallow FTA is negotiated between the EU and UK, but NTMs between 
the EU and UK will emerge. As expected, British consumers would experience the 
largest losses in welfare of around 3.1 percent on average if the UK exits the EU and 
the EU signs the TTIP. If the EU does not sign the TTIP, the impact is slightly 
improved with a 2.74 percent loss. This result is similar to Dhingra et al. (2017) who 
found a loss in welfare of 1.34 percent in the optimistic case and 2.66 percent in the 
pessimistic case. Finally, signing the TTIP and staying in the EU would increase 
consumer welfare in the UK by 0.17 percent. This result is lower than estimates of 
Felbermayr et al. (2015), but similar to Francois et al. (2013). As results in columns (4) 
and (5) indicate, the loss of welfare caused by Brexit cannot be compensated by 
signing an FTA with the US or with Commonwealth countries. The losses of welfare 
in those scenarios are still substantial, 2.1 and 2 percent, repectively.  
 Panel B of Table 4 present the welfare analysis of ‘hard’ Brexit, when the UK 
withdraws from the single market, imposes MFN tariffs and both sides erect NTM 
barriers typical to the ones they impose against countries without preferential 
treatment. Such a negative scenario would lead to 4.1-5.2 percent welfare losses 
relative to the benchmark status quo. Panel C of Table 4 presents welfare changes if 
we ignore the effect of the extensive margins on trade flows. As these results show, 
the trade-creating effect of TTIP and potential FTAs is lower while the trade-
reducing effect of Brexit is lower. These results highlight importance of modelling 
both impact of trade policy changes on extensive and intensive trade margins. 
 Finally, in Panel D of Table 4 we present the welfare analysis for the trade effects 
estimated by the IV technique with point estimates taken from column (3) of Table 2. 
Staying in the EU and signing TTIP would have increased welfare in the UK by 0.66 
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percent. All Brexit scenarios generate welfare losses. The losses from Brexit are 
stronger than the more conservative estimates based on coefficients from column (3). 
Average loss of welfare due to Brexit is 3 percent if TTIP is not signed and 4.4 
percent if TTIP is signed. Taking the elasticity of substitution equal to 4, conditional 
on Brexit, British consumers would be almost 2 percent better off if the TTIP is not 
signed. This result highlights benefits of being a member of a large economic bloc in 
negotiating trade deals. Welfare losses of Brexit are substantially mitigated by 
negotiating new trade deals with the US or Commonwealth countries, leading to 
only 0.57 and 0.56 percent welfare losses. 
 Finally, given estimation of the dynamic effects of RTA/EU elasticities of trade 
presented in section 5.4, there are two conflicting tendencies that should be taken 
into account when interpreting welfare gains presented in Table 4. First, even the 
‘hard’ Brexit scenario would not cause abrupt welfare losses and catastrophic decline 
of trade flows between the EU and UK. The changes occur gradually. On the other 
hand, currently, RTAs especially CUs and EU in particular, have the strongest trade 
creation effect over the last 50 years, which would indicate that the welfare losses of 
Brexit are likely to be higher and welfare gains of TTIP would increase over time.  
5.6. CU vs FTA 
 
According to the comparison of the FTA and CU coefficients (column (5) of Table 2), 
CUs generate 118% more trade then FTAs. This result is attributed to the absence of 
non-tariff barriers and going through customs, associated with CUs. Shallow FTAs, 
which target tariff reductions only, do not generate much trade in the current low-
tariff environment. Column (6) of Table 2 presents estimates of the elasticity of trade 
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with respect to the applied tariff while controlling for RTA and EU, which is close to 
-1. Given that the average MFN rate in the EU is around 3 percent, this suggests that 
by keeping zero applied tariffs with the EU, the UK would be able to avert an 
additional 3 percent reduction in its exports to the EU. However, the negative effect 
is much larger. When we analyse the welfare impact, it does not translate into 
noticeable welfare improvements for the scenarios that involve Brexit, essentially 
leaving our baseline results intact. 
6. Robustness checks 
 
6.1. Resource cost barriers and welfare 
 
We consider a sensitivity analysis exploring whether an increase/reduction in 
resource costs, required to satisfy to NTM requirements (i.e. rules of origin, technical 
standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures) associated with Brexit/TTIP, 
influences our welfare analysis. We model the resource cost as additional cost that 
increases the price of output 𝑝′ = 𝑝 + 𝜏 by certain value, 𝜏, which is scaled in 
proportion to the trade costs ln𝜑. Exit from the EU would increase resource costs 
required to organize border controls, check NTM requirements and rule of origins, 
etc. TTIP, on the other hand, would reduce resource costs due to NTM 
harmonization. Table 5 presents our results. Higher resource costs increase negative 
effect of Brexit on welfare, while having a small effect on welfare gains for UK due to 
TTIP. Welfare costs increase monotonically with increasing resource costs. 
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Table 5: Resource cost barriers and welfare 
 Additional 
resource Welfare gains, % 
cost, share of 
total trade costs  TTIP EU TTIP Brexit 
No TTIP 
and Brexit 
US UK FTA 
CMWTH 
FTA 
0.01 0.17 -3.00 -2.46 -1.83 -1.76 
0.02 0.17 -3.31 -2.60 -1.97 -1.89 
0.03 0.17 -3.62 -2.75 -2.11 -2.03 
0.04 0.17 -3.93 -2.90 -2.24 -2.16 
0.05 0.16 -4.23 -3.04 -2.38 -2.30 
0.06 0.16 -4.54 -3.19 -2.52 -2.43 
0.07 0.16 -4.85 -3.33 -2.66 -2.56 
0.08 0.16 -5.15 -3.48 -2.79 -2.69 
0.09 0.15 -5.45 -3.62 -2.93 -2.83 
0.1 0.15 -5.75 -3.77 -3.07 -2.96 
Notes: This table presents a representative consumer welfare gains or losses due to 5 counterfactual scenarios, 
under assumptions of soft Brexit, which maintains shallow FTA, but imposes NTMs on EU and the UK. The 
gains and losses are measured relative to the status quo of the UK as a member of EU and no TTIP is signed. 
Computations are performed for 𝜎 = 5.16 
 
 
6.2. Sensitivity analysis: different levels of RTA impact on trade 
 
Proponents of the TTIP may argue that our method of modelling this arrangement as 
an average trade agreement, representative of past agreements, is too conservative. 
They may argue that the TTIP is a completely new, XXIst century type of FTA, which 
will go much further in terms of the liberalization of goods, services, and removal of 
NTBs. On the other hand, critics of the TTIP may claim that the effect of the 
agreement will be close to zero because trade has already been liberalised between 
the EU and US. 
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Table 6: Welfare gains for different levels of RTA impact 
Scenario and RTA 
strength 
Mean welfare 
gain, % 
Standard 
Deviation  
5th 
percentile, 
% 
95th 
percentile, % 
EU&TTIP, ?̂?1
𝐶𝐸 0.15 0.21 -0.06 0.54 
Brexit&TTIP, ?̂?2
𝐶𝐸 -2.81 0.60 -3.87 -2.14 
Brexit&No TTIP, ?̂?3
𝐶𝐸 -2.48 0.25 -2.92 -2.17 
US UK FTA, ?̂?4
𝐶𝐸 -1.91 0.45 -2.29 -1.14 
CMWTH FTA, ?̂?5
𝐶𝐸 -1.88 0.45 -2.36 -1.09 
Notes: Computations are based on the estimated effect of EU from column (2) of Table 2. The effect of 
RTA is drawn from a distribution with mean 0.36 and standard deviation 0.42, which matches the 
sample moments for the distribution of the RTA coefficients from the meta study by Head and Mayer 
(2014). This analysis is repeated 100 times and the distribution of welfare gains is generated. Elasticity 
sigma is fixed at 5.13 for this exercise. 
 
 
To confirm the robustness of our results for different levels of the TTIP impact on 
trade flows we perform additional simulations. We consider a distribution of 
plausible TTIP effects as given by the RTA coefficients from the meta-study 
conducted by Head and Mayer (2014). They found that the distribution of the impact 
of RTAs on trade flows, from 108 studies using structurally estimated gravity 
modelling, to have a mean of 0.36 and standard deviation of 0.42. Therefore, we 
model the potential TTIP impact as a normally distributed random variable, 
𝑁(0.36, 0.42). We take 100 random draws from this distribution and evaluate welfare 
gains for each RTA draw, ranging from 0.31 to 1.76. The results of the distribution of 
welfare gains for different policy scenarios and the elasticity of substitution 
parameter 𝜎 = 5.13 are presented in Table 6. On average, Scenario 1 generates a 
welfare gain of 0.15 percent, Scenario 2 generates a welfare loss of 2.81 percent, and 
Scenario 3 generates a welfare loss of 2.48 percent. Scenario 2 also generates the 
highest volatility. Scenarios 4 and 5 generate losses of 1.91 and 1.88 percent 
respectively. We also report 5th and 95th percentiles of the distributions of gains for 
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each scenario and indicate them in the table. The results demonstrate that our 
welfare gain estimates are quite robust to the error in the estimation of the effect of 
FTA.  Figure 5 presents the welfare gains depending on the strength of RTA impact. 
These simulations indicate that the best option for the UK would be to stay within 
the EU regardless of whether TTIP is signed or not. Moreover, the negative effect of 
Brexit on UK welfare increases as the TTIP impact on trade becomes stronger.  
Figure 5: Welfare gains for different levels of RTA impact 
 
 
6.3. Sensitivity analysis: TTIP and economic growth 
 
For robustness, we also consider how the additional effects from the TTIP would 
influence our results. Suppose the TTIP generates economic growth in the country-
members due to liberalization of capital and migration flows, and reduction of NTBs. 
We model this as a uniform increase in GDP of the TTIP members of 𝑔 percent, 
where 𝑔 takes values of 1 to 10 percent. Further, we re-estimate our structural model 
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and compute corresponding welfare gains, assuming 𝜎 = 5.13. The results are 
presented in Figure 6. As expected, the UK would benefit from being a member of 
TTIP, but if the UK is out of EU, the additional indirect welfare gains from TTIP 
would not compensate for the welfare losses from exiting the EU. 
Figure 6: Welfare gains for different levels of GDP growth 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Given the current difficulties in achieving multilateral trade liberalization alongside 
the geopolitical power struggle, our analysis indicates that countries benefit from 
integrating into large regional trade/economic blocs. Our results demonstrate that 
countries left out of this process experience significant economic losses, stemming 
from trade diversion and trade preference erosion. Our structural gravity results are 
benchmarked against the findings in the existing literature. Furthermore, we have 
conducted additional experiments to confirm the robustness of our results. This 
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emerging research framework provides a tractable model of global trade without 
compromising its general equilibrium features. We estimate a lower bound of UK 
welfare losses from exiting the EU and signing the TTIP. The losses are derived from 
changes in trade costs, while output and expenditure stay constant. If we account for 
other channels mentioned in the literature, the negative effects of exiting the EU will 
be higher. 
Depreciation of the pound after the Brexit referendum boosted exports, but 
the effect is likely to be short lived. Cover and Mallick (2012) highlight that 
historically exchange rate shocks have not had a significant impact on UK business 
cycles. Moreover, consumers have already experienced welfare losses due to the 
acceleration of inflation. Therefore, the net overall effect of the pound depreciation is 
likely to be small in the long run. 
A resurgence of the Commonwealth group as a mega-regional would be 
beneficial, although not to the extent that it would compensate for the losses 
associated with Brexit. Furthermore, signing FTAs with the largest commonwealth 
countries will not be without its challenges, in terms of competing trade policy 
objectives as well as the perception of imbalanced colonial-style partnerships. A US-
UK FTA also faces significant political difficulties and if realised, the benefits would 
not outweigh the negative effect of Brexit.  
The UK decision to step outside the EU framework and embark on 
independently negotiating trade deals is a risky endeavour and likely to bring 
significant welfare losses. The signature of the TTIP would further weaken the UK’s 
position. The UK would be wise to negotiate a route to play the new mega-regional 
‘game’ as part of the EU bloc, although this seems unlikely. It remains to be seen 
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whether the UK can remain an integral part of the EU project, perhaps even EU 
member in all but name, while seeming to accept the democratic result of the 
referendum. Moreover, the UK’s lack of commitment towards the EU project needs 
to reach some degree of resolution so that members can focus on reforms and 
address the geopolitical pressures from Asia. 
We recognize that the TTIP can generate several important economic benefits, 
which go beyond the scope of this paper. First, the TTIP can boost productivity 
growth due to better access to a larger variety of inputs and services. Second, it can 
generate efficiency gains due to external economies of scale and scope. Third, it can 
boost knowledge spillovers, and improve the allocation of capital and labour. Recent 
studies have introduced dynamic knowledge accumulation into trade models and 
shown that the dynamic welfare gains may be substantial (Sampson, 2016). Fourth, 
our model does not look at sectoral effects of Brexit, which are important for policy 
analysis.  It is also true that introduction of sectors in the model may change the 
welfare calculations, but only if one does not appropriately deal with zero trade 
flows (Ossa, 2015). Our approach models and structurally estimates selection into 
exporters with heterogeneous firms and the possibility of zero trade flows. Finally, 
special treatment should be considered for agricultural and services sectors. We 
leave these important questions for future research. 
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